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1 Introduction
South Africa's post-apartheid government has com-
mitted itself to redressing the imbalances of the
past, with the aim of improving the quality of life
for millions of black people. Policy-makers aim to
develop policies that will have a positive effect on
the poorest people of South Africa, particularly
those who live in rural areas (ANC 1994). In pol-
icy documents, communities are regarded as cen-
tral to development and community-based
sustainable development is seen as the way to
achïeve these ambitious goals. In rural develop-
ment programmes, new policies give communities
responsibilities to decide on the directions to take.
This is especially true of development in and
around protected areas, where there is pressure on
nature conservation authorities to relate to the wel-
fare needs of the neighbouring communities
(Environmental Affairs and Tourism 1996).
However, while these policies have good inten-
tions, the assumptions on which they are based -
such as those that suggest community coherence
and harmonious interaction between rural commu-
nities and the environment - have become subject
to increasing critique.
'Community-based sustainable development' has
become central to the development rhetoric of the
'new' South Africa. As part of the new democratic
dispensation, rural communities, it is argued,
should now have a stake in their own development
and a constitutional right to have a say in matters
that affect their future. But what does this mean in
practice, especïally where development options are
hotly contested? How can rights over land and
resources be renegotiated when competing
claimants argue that their rights should prevail?
How can local voices be heard when large, regional
economic development initiatives (such as the
Spatial Development Initiative for the Wild Coast)
are being planned? In areas near parks and
reserves, how can new bargains be struck between
local people and conservation authorities, given a
long history of antagonism between them? These
are just some of the questions being faced by pol-
icy-makers and development agents across rural
South Africa, questions which are particularly per-
tinent in the case of protected areas along the Wild
Coast in the former Transkei.
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Xholobeni
Through a case study of the Mkambati area of the
Wild Coast, in the Eastern Cape Province of South
Africa, this article explores how the interaction of
social and ecological dynamics affects the liveli-
hoods of the rural poor who live near protected
conservation areas. Using the environmental enti-
tlements framework (see Leach et al. 1997), it seeks
to explain how local peoples use and management
of resources within and outside the protected areas,
are shaped by institutional arrangements at both
local and macro-levels. Two livelihood cases are
used to illustrate how resource-related community
and institutional conflicts impact on livelihoods.
The article concludes by exploring some of the pol-
icy implications for rural people's livelihoods and
protected area management interactions.
2 The Wild Coast: People and
Protected Areas
The case study area is situated on the eastern coast
of South Africa, in the district of Lusikisiki (see
Figure 1). This section of the Wild Coast falls within
the boundaries of the former Transkei. The Transkei
was one of South Africa's ten black homelands, and
the first of four to gain self-rule in 1976. Since
1994, the Transkei has become part of the Eastern
Cape Province. This province, one of nine in South
Africa, has a population of seven million people.
The case study focused on the Mkambati area,
which includes three communal settlements
(namely Ngwenyeni, Baleni and Ndengane),
Mkambati Nature Reserve and the TRACOR
(Transkei Agricultural Corporation) state farm. The
inhabitants of the area are Xhosa-speaking people
and known as AmaMpondo, a group that mounted
significant resistance to colonial rule from the nine-
teenth century (Mbeki 1965; Beinart 1982). While
off-farm sources of income are important to local
survival, local resources, including crop and live-
stock production and harvesting of a range of nat-
ural resources, make a vital contribution to people's
livelihoods (Kepe 1997).
The mean annual rainfall is 1200 mm, with at least
50 mm expected every month of the year. The area
Archeological evidence suggests that this vegetation
pattern of extensive grassland and small areas of
woodland has probably been stable for a long time
(Feely 1987; Ellery and Mentis 1992). This contrasts
with some commentaries on environmental change in
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is dominated by poor soils of sandstone origin,
although clay soil patches increase as one moves
away from the coast. The combination of sandstone
and high rainfall results ïn acidic, shallow sandy
soils that are highly permeable (Tinley 1978). More
than 80 per cent of the vegetation is sour grassland,
with small patches of sub-tropical evergreen forests
that are concentrated along river gorges and coastal
sand dunes'. Amongst this vegetation are rare plants
that have high conservation value, such as the
endemic Pondo palm (Jubaeopsis caffra), locally
known as uMkomba.
Mkambati Nature Reserve has its beginnings in
1920 when more than 17,000 hectares of land was
fenced off for a leper colony Local livestock keepers
who inhabited the grasslands close to the coast were
forcibly removed to make way for buildings and
livestock. Following improvement in the treatment
of leprosy in the 1950s, the demarcated area ceased
to serve its original purpose, and became a nature
reserve (6,000 hectares) and a state agriculture farm
(11,000 hectares) in 1977. Hundreds of herbivores
were first introduced into the area in 1979. The
reserve first operated as a hunting concern under a
partnership between two successive private compa-
nies and the government, attracting tourists from all
over the country Due to alleged mismanagement,
no more hunting was allowed after 1982, but the
reserve currently supports 1,700 wild herbivores.
The reserve also supports local communities
through opportunities for collection of various nat-
ural resources including thatch grass, medicinal
plants, timber products and marine resources, as
well as illegal hunting.
The following sections explore how different people
living in the villages around Mkambati reserve
make use of a variety of natural resources, both
from within the reserve, from the state land and
from within the village areas. Two livelihood strate-
gies are highlighted - hunting and thatch grass col-
lection. Both are significant for rural livelihoods in
different ways and for different social actors. As the
case studies show, access to and control over these
resources is mediated by a set of interacting and
this area which sees the gorge forests as 'relics' of a past
extensive forest area. In fact, it appears that tree cover
has increased in the recent period through planting of
homestead woodlots and the encouragement of
regrowth in and around settlement sites.
overlapping institutions. For those resources
derived from within the reserve boundary institu-
tional conflicts between villagers and the reserve
management may anse. An analysis of these insti-
tutional interactions, overlaps and conflicts high-
lights the major trade-offs which need to be
negotiated in any co-management arrangement
between local villagers and reserve management.
3 Seeking Out Livelihoods:
Endowments and Entitlements
Game hunting
Rural people who live on the coast of Pondoland
have been hunting wild animals over many cen-
turies (Feely 1987; Hunter 1979; Beinart 1982).
Indeed, the early inhabitants of the area, who were
hunters and gatherers, travelled in groups during
their hunts (Perestrello 1554). However, according
to Beinart (1982), the importance of hunting large
game started to diminish during the nineteenth
century This coincided with the introduction of
firearms, although hunting of small game, such as
buck and birds, has continued (Hunter 1979).
Many changes have taken place which have altered
the role of hunting in rural peoples livelihoods.
Areas that were previously hunting grounds have
been replaced by human settlements, fields and
other infrastructure such as public roads. In addi-
tion much of the remaining game, that was previ-
ously readily available to rural hunters, has now
been enclosed and protected in state parks, private
game reserves and farms. Hunting in South Africa is
now largely carried out by two groups - the urban
rich, who normally do it for sport, as well as com-
mercial purposes, and the rural poor, for whom
hunting is another of their diverse range of liveli-
hood sources. Legal access to hunting is now regu-
lated by national legislation, as well as the amount
of cash that individuals have. In many ways this
excludes the rural poor.
A case study of how rural hunters living around
Mkambati Nature Reserve gain access to wild game
will be presented here, paying particular attention
to the dynamic environment in which this takes
place and the range of institutions that mediate
access to wildlife (see Figure 2). The grasslands of
Mkambati Nature Reserve are stocked with herbi-
vores dominated by blesbok and wildebeest, as well
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as other smaller animals such as baboons, rabbits
and so forth. These grasslands serve as a hunting envi-
ronment for the neighbouring rural communities.
Hunting is a male activity, although very young
boys and unfit men do not go on major hunts, due
to the many dangers associated with this activity
The youngest hunters are about 14 years of age,
while the oldest are about 50. The majority of local
hunters are unemployed and have limited alterna-
tive sources of livelihood compared to other vil-
lagers. While many of these hunters still hunt wild
animals in order to supplement their maize-based
diet, in recent years there has been a growing num-
ber who are motivated by the growing demand for
certain animal species in the traditional medicine
business. In such cases these hunters trade in parts
of the animal to supplement their income.
There is another group of larger-scale commercial
hunters, who also hunt in Mkambati (Skonhoft and
Solstad 1996: 168). Local perception is that these
hunters are poachers. They hunt primarily for tro-
phies, which is a more lucrative option than the
sporadic hunting by local villagers. Two other lines
of social difference distinguish the two types of
hunters. Firstly, larger-scale commercial hunters
usually reside far from the hunting location. In
other words they are not considered as local people
in terms of geographical location, and, indeed, in
many other ways. Secondly, they are wealthier than
most villagers, this being displayed by the modern
and sophisticated equipment they use for hunting,
from vehicles to guns and spot lights. The way these
non-local hunters conduct themselves has encour-
aged local people to despise them greatly Local per-
ception is that larger-scale hunters are there to
diminish local resources. This is reflected in com-
ments by local people. For example, one man com-
mented: 'when we sit and discuss our village affairs
and take particular decisions about how we do this
and that, these hunters are not here. How can we
then view them as part of us?' Another man com-
mented that: 'we can carry on accusing each other
for something that we think was done by one of us,
only to find out that it is these people who come
here to just destroy our things without even asking
us for permission'. In terms of numbers, local
hunters appear to be more numerous, but the
impact of the larger scale hunters on wildlife
populations is more noticeable.
Figure 2: Environmental Entitlements Analysis: The Case of Hunting in Mkambati
Reserve
Game in Mkambati grasslands
Rights over animals (e.g.
wildebeest, blesbok, duiker)
Village hunters: unemployed,
able-bodied males;
Non-local poachers': wealthier, males;
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- National legal framework:
conservation laws
Mac
Traditional authority: chiefs and
headmen
- Civic associations
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Intra-household arrangements
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A complex array of institutions mediate access to
game in Mkambati. Some of these have changed in
nature over time, and some have even been sup-
planted by others. For example, in the past, when
wild animals were still plentiful, the right of access
to hunting grounds used to be open to all men of
the chiefdom (Hunter 1979). After the disposses-
sion of certain areas and their fencing off as nature
reserves, rural hunters had their right of access
effectively removed.
However, in Mkambati Nature Reserve, neighbour-
ing villagers have, over the last 20 years, justified
hunting by reference to the notion of ukujola2. In
terms of this notion, hunting in Mkambati Nature
Reserve does not constitute a crime, because there
is a general understanding among the villagers that
the reserve is still part of their environment, an area
they always had access to. This notion is not new in
Pondoland. The early literature on the life of the
Pondos before and after annexation refer to this
concept: For example, Callaway (undated: 69)
quotes Bishop Key who wrote of the Fondos a few
years prior to the 1894 annexation:
At one time theft was almost unknown in
Pondoland. A Native has been known to follow
a trader's wagon for miles for the purpose of
restoring a handkerchief which had been
dropped. But the resistance offered to the extra-
dition of thieves has had a very bad effect on the
people Protection has been shown to thieves
from other tribes who have run into Pondoland
with their spoil. This has been done simply,
they will tell you, by way of retaliation. They
consider that they have been badly treated, and,
being the weaker party, they have used these
means of repaying themselves by a system of
passive resistance...
It is this passive resistance (cf. Scott, 1985; 1990),
which has sustained this institution over the years,
because ukujola is non-confrontational. Hunters are
This is a local term that refers to locally legitimised
'stealing' of a resource, based on historical claims to it,
that predate the existing legislation. This is taken from
another social norm, which has the same name, but
refers to a love relationship between two young people
of the opposite sex, According to local norms, the two
young lovers must keep their affair secret from their
respective parents or other relatives of a respectable
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vaguely aware of government regulations (e.g. the
Environmental Conservation Decree of 1992)
which forbid hunting in nature reserves without
official permit. Since the idea of ukujola conflicts
with these regulations, the hunters ensure that gov-
ernment officials do not see them inside the reserve,
as it is understood that confrontation may result in
arrest and even injury
However, there is one issue on which all villagers
and the reserve management agree; that is that com-
mercial poachers from outside the local communi-
ties have absolutely no claim to legitimate access to
wïld game ïn Mkambati. Their access amounts to
skilful theft of resources they have no historical
claim to. The use of local resources by outsiders,
without proper consultation with local inhabitants,
is viewed as a sign of disrespect of local rules and
regulations; poachers are therefore unpopular
among local communities.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, govern-
ment law in the rural areas of the former bantustans
was enforced through chiefs and headmen. Given
authority by the state over 'customary' affairs, so-
called 'traditional' leaders were seen to be the
appropriate representatives of local communities.
This version of indirect rule was often resented by
local people, and the legitimacy of the chiefs and
headmen questioned. This came to a head with the
rise of the civic organisations, mostly operating
under the banner of the South African National
Civic Organisations (SANCO). In recent years new
forms of legitimate authority have been created,
allowing new social actors to enter the local politi-
cal arena. With the wider changes in national poli-
tics over the last decade, the question of who has
legitimacy and authority in the rural areas has
become increasingly difficult to answer (Manona
1997; Tapscott 1996). Today rural communities
are far from the idealised image of a harmonious,
cohesive grouping with firm and effective tradi-
tional leadership rooted in the past. Since many
status. Ukujola, in this case therefore means the two
main participants had reached an understanding about
their affair, but, because they are aware of possible
consequences if parents found out, they do all in their
power to hide from them. They would, however, firmly
believe that they are not doing anything wrong. Ukujola
is used the same way when referring to natural
resources,
'communities' and their 'traditional leaders' were
creations of colonial intervention, it is of course
unlikely that such a pattern ever existed at all.
However, such images remain powerful allures in
the debate about co-management and community-
based sustainable development in South Africa. But
it needs to be recognised that the reconfiguration of
local political power and the increased contestation
of leadership and authority makes such idealised
notions of 'community' highly misleading.
New power relations at the local level, of course,
have a major impact on the institutional matrix
which affects people's resource access, as well as the
ways different practices are interpreted and legit-
imised. For example, the rise of the civic organisa-
tions has affected the hunting activities of local
communities in Mkambati Nature Reserve in a vari-
ety of ways. In their attempt to claim authority over
the chiefs and headmen of the area and to be shown
as the legitimate leaders who strive for development
and justice, the civic organisations have encouraged
the articulation of the institution and ukujola to
gain rights of access to wild game and lay a claim to
an environment that they believe belongs to the
community At the same time, civic organisation
leaders have been attempting to initiate official
negotiations with the reserve authorities, demon-
strating their capacity to interact with government
bureaucracy on behalf of the people. However, such
behaviour does not impress everyone, and those
with kin or other affiliations to headmen and chiefs
dismiss such populist moves and back alternative
strategies put forward by the so-called traditional
leadership. The result, not surprisingly, is confu-
sion. For villagers, negotiations around any local
issue takes on a strong political slant, with alle-
giances, alliances and conflicts noted intently For
outsiders, including the conservation authorities
eager to negotiate a co-management arrangement,
the problem becomes who to initiate discussions
with. As one official put it: 'there is no community
and no leadership; it's just one big minefield!'
Gaining access to the reserve is simply the first step
in àttempting to gain effective legitimate command
over the game resources inside Mkambati Nature
Reserve. There are other institutions involved in
converting the right of access to Mkambati game
Interview with a 16 year old hunter from Baleni.
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into a set of entitlements. The first is the hunting
party or íngqina. When people use the expression
'ukuphttm'ingqina' this implies a group hunting
party These hunting parties are drawn from home-
steads, neighbourhood groupings (isithebe) or dif-
ferent villages (Hunter 1979). But the method used
to catch game determines the composition of the
hunting party This can be explained through the
words of a Baleni hunter:
There are people in Xholobeni village who use
traps to catch animals. Consequently, we from
Baleni have to inform them whenever we intend
going for a hunt to ensure that they disarm the
traps, which could seriously harm our dogs. In
other words, we either have to invite them to
join our ingqina or give us a right of way on
their side of the forest and Mkambati, by being
considerate of our dogs.3
This mutual working relationship among different
hunters is not only important for the sake of the
dogs. The manner in which the herbivores are
hunted in Mkambati also requires cooperation
among a wide range of social actors. Hunters burn
grass strips close to the reserve boundary to encour-
age new growth. This, in turn, attracts game which
can easily be shot at. This strategy requires inter-
group cooperation in coordinated burning to avoid
having many newly burnt sites that could end up con-
fusing the game. Conservation officials, on the other
hand, counter-burn in the centre of the reserve to
attract the game away from the boundary zone, leading
one reserve official to refer to a 'tug of war with fire'.
Hunters use trained dogs and guns when hunting.
Guns are particularly important, because the activ-
ity has to take place very quickly to avoid discovery
by the reserve guards. While many hunters make
their own guns, others are bought in both local and
external markets or are borrowed. Borrowing is
mostly mediated by kinship networks and by an
ethic of mutual aid (ukuncedisana). lt is considered
safer to put your trust in your immediate kinspeo-
pIe and people of the neighbourhood rather than
other people who are more distantly related. Those
who lend guns (or even hunting dogs), do get some
reward for doing so, and it is a common practice in
the social life of the Pondo people to share a portion
of produce as a token of appreciation with those
from whom assistance was received.
Depending on the type of animal that is hunted, dif-
ferent sets of entitlements are derived. If a wilde-
beest is hunted, for instance, the tail is the most
important immediate entitlement which later can
be converted into yet another entitlement - cash,
through its sale to the traditional medicine market
in Durban. Wildebeest tails have been known to
fetch very high prices in the market. The venison,
hides, horns and so forth can also be converted to
cash income when the market allows.
Access to game within the reserve is likely to con-
tinue until the government can no longer ignore
peoples claims to resources, including land, that
are now under government protection. lt is clear
that trying to prevent 'illegal' hunting through
policing only is not a viable solution, because uku-
jota is non-confrontational and it is unlikely that
there will be an open clash with law enforcement
agents under the present circumstances. However,
unregulated poaching by outsiders has the potential
to disrupt local game management strategies severely
A potential therefore exists for co-management
arrangements between local hunters who currently
gain access to wild game through ukujola and the
conservation department, with both joining forces to
exclude commercial poachers from the area.
Thatch grass collection
Another important resource available within the
reserve is thatch grass. Certain grass species such as
Cymbopogon validus (umqungu) , Miscanthus capen-
sis (umthala) and Hyperrenia spp. (iDobo) have a
very high value as thatching material. Of these three
grasses, Cymbopogon validus is the most preferred,
due to its smooth finish (Johnson 1982). Spatial
and temporal variations in ecological sites in the
case study area result in regular shortages of
Cymbopogon validus. The high sand content of the
soils in the area is unfavourable for Cybopogon
validus (Shackleton 1994), suggesting that this type
of grass has probably never been very abundant.
Cymbopogon validus is currently found in three
local environments - Mkambati Nature Reserve,
TRACOR state farm land and the village areas. In
the village it is either protected from grazing and
fire or planted by some individuals. In general, the
grass is very patchily distributed, growing largely on
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heavier soils or in areas with previous disturbance
(e.g. settlement sites, termite mounds, old fields etc.).
Cybopogon validus is presently most abundant in
Mkambati Nature Reserve, where in the late 1980s it
covered more than 500 hectares (Shackleton 1990).
This is the major site for collection by neighbouring
villagers. The grass is spread out in numerous
patches that range in size from one to 87 hectares.
Certain sites considered by reserve management as
ecologically sensitive (e.g. sites that are very close to
indigenous swamp forests) are excluded from har-
vesting.
In the past there were areas in the villages reserved
for Cybopogon validus and Hyperrenia spp. which
were protected from grazing and fire. Offenders
were fined by the chief or warned. With the gradual
decline in the legitimacy of the institution of chief-
taincy, combined with population increase, the pro-
tection that was once afforded this common pool
resource is now effectively gone. Uncontrolled
burning has resulted in increasing scarcity of
Cybopogon validus in all areas. Grass shortages have
led to investment in Cybopogon va/idus manage-
ment in the village. This has involved, firstly, the
protection of patches around the homestead from
fire and, secondly, some villàgers plant the seeds of
Cybopogon va/idus in their fields. Thus, within the
village areas, heightened resource scarcity has
resulted in institutional innovation, with former
arrangements of village-wide communal regulation
of burning and grazing giving way to more localised
neighbourhood-level regulation of resource use and
even privatisation of grass patches through protec-
tion or planting.
While detailed studies were done during the 1980s
on the use of Cybopogon va/idus by local people
and the ecological impact of its harvesting
(Shackleton 1990), institutional aspects of this
activity have been largely ignored. Thatch grass
remains important for many people's livelihoods as
it is essential for most roofing in the area, but with
increasing scarcïty of the favoured species, more
effective resource management mechanisms are
required. With the major source of thatch grass
being the reserve area, co-management of this
resource is clearly one option. The following section
explores how different people gain legitimate and
effective command over the thatch grass resource
within different environments, focussing on the
Figure 3: Environmental Entitlements Analysis: Thatch Grass Collection
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institutional factors which mediate resource access
and the implications this has for co-management
options.
In Mkambati grass collectors are able-bodied
women from the neighbouring villages. This
includes those who collect grass for personal use,
those who collect for sale and those who collect for
others, as hired labourers. Women who collect to
sell or who are hired labourers mostly come from de
facto female headed households, and largely
depend on collection of other plant material for
sale. Within the village, grass collectors include
those who make use of either planted grass areas
(including some men) or grass patches that are pro-
tected from fire through early burning practices.
Management regulations of Mkambati Nature
Reserve influence rights of access to thatch grass.
During the leper reserve era, villagers gained access
to grass through kin who worked in Mkambati.
Currently, payment of cash to reserve management
for unlimited headloads (izithungu) of grass is for-
mally required4. 'Bribery' of guards through offering
sexual favours is common among unmarried
women, allowing them preferential access to certain
grass patches in the reserve. The comment of one
married woman sheds some light on this:
If you are married you really struggle when the
grass is limited. That man will take the
amadikazi [unmarried or divorced or widowed
women] and put them where the grass is nice
and thick, because he can get sexual favours
from them. Since we are married and can't offer
him what those amadikazi can offer, he treats us
like we do not exist.5
While no longer as common as it was, the notion of
ukujola is also important for legitimating informal
rights over grass in Mkambati, and avoiding payments.
In the villages, the protection of grass from burning or
planting it in field plots secures rights of access for
those who either invest in the protection process or
who own the land. Other villagers who require grass
in the villages, but are not involved in its protection or
planting, have to trade with those who do.
Villagers pay ten rands per person, of which five rands
is supposed to remain with the reserve, while the other
five rands goes to a community fund. However, this
sharing arrangement has never worked out. The reserve
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In all the environments where grass is collected,
various local institutions are important for mobilis-
ing labour for its collection or transportation to the
site where it will be used. Women take the sole
responsibility for cutting thatch grass in Mkambati
and TRACOR, while men may be occasionally
involved in planting and protection of the grass in
the villages. Other social actors within a household,
who are not able to collect thatch grass from
Mkambati themselves, gain entitlements through
kinship linkages. Elderly women, for instance, can
send their daughters to do the cutting for them.
Trading and hiring arrangements are among the
range of institutions that mediate access to thatch
grass for those who cannot collect.
Due to the long distance between some villages and
Mkambati, transportation becomes crucial for gain-
ing grass. Trucks are therefore hired, costing about
one hundred rands per load. However, villagers
who are much closer to Mkambati (e.g. from
Ndengane), make use of other local institutions.
Amalinia (work parties) are organised by the host
household, where the participants first carry the
grass on their heads or shoulders before enjoying
the beer or food that is provided. The provision of
beer or food requires that the hosts should have
some resources to be able to provide these. Those
who are not in a position to provide the beer or food,
but still need help to transport the grass, call on
another institution - mutual aid or ukuncedisana.
A variety of institutions are therefore important in
gaining access to thatch grass (see Figure 3). During
the endowment mapping process these include the
reserve's regulations, combined with informal
mechanisms of gaining access through bribery or
uhujola. The entitlement mapping process, in turn,
relies on a variety of institutions for mobilising
labour and transport, ranging from informal kin
networks and sharing relationships to formal con-
tracting and hire. What are the implications for co-
management options of this analysis? Unlike in the
case of hunting, it appears that there is no funda-
mental institutional conflict between grass collec-
tors and the reserve management. The two group's
objectives are appparently compatible and conflicts
now keeps all the money
A married woman's comment during a thatch grass
collectors' focus group.
are rare, making joint use of thatch grass resources
in the reserve a possibility
4 Transforming the Environment
In order to assess the viability of different co-man-
agement options, trade-offs in environmental
impact have to be considered. Both hunting and
thatch grass collection inevitably transform the
environment to some degree. The grasslands of the
Mkambati area are the product of long histories of
burning, grazing by wild and domestic animals and
the collection of plant products. They are not pris-
tine landscapes, but are created by human action.
The choice of what type of environment to have is
therefore an active one. And the ideal landscape
depends on who you are. This makes negotiations
around environmental issues particularly sensitive.
So, what should the Mkambati reserve environment
look like? The village hunters may wish for exten-
sive game, with grazing managed by heavy burning
to create a short, nutritious grass sward. But those
women who collect thatch grass in the reserve
would strongly object to this vision, as the heavy
burning regularly destroys the thatch grass and this,
combined with intensive grazing, eventually elimi-
nates the favoured grass species, Cybopogon
validus. Others may have other ideas. The current
reserve management, for instance, has a manage-
ment plan that sees plant biodiversity protection
through managed, rotational grazing and burning
and complete burning and grazing protection in
more vulnerable spots as the prime motive. Yet, in
the past, reserve managers aimed at maximising
hunting revenues through the artificial stocking of
certain game and trophy species. With the planned
construction of a coastal road, many business people
have tourist potential as a key priority, emphasising
the scenic beauty of the rolling grasslands, the
wildlife and the seashore.
Some resource use options are clearly more com-
patible than others, with greater prospects for
resolving conflicts and dealing with overlapping
rights. For example, thatch grass collection appears
to be perfectly in tune with many nature conserva-
tion objectives, while hunting is evidently not. The
trade-offs between different options therefore need
to be made explicit in any discussion about co-
management.
57
5 Prospects for Co-Management?
This article has illustrated the complexities of
people, livelihood and environment relations in a
situation of social and economic change. In particu-
lar, the use of the environmental entitlements frame-
work to analyse such interactions proved useful.
The emphasis on institutions has highlighted the
serious conflicts around authority at a local level,
with major effects on people's livelihoods (e.g.
chieftaincy and civic associations); conflicts also
exist between the national legal framework and
local understanding of what is legitimate (e.g. gov-
ernment legislation on nature reserves and ukujola);
and there is a high degree of complementarity
between institutions mediating access to natural
resources. For example, sexual divisions of labour,
kinship network, neighbourhood groupings
(isithebe), mutual aid norms (ukuncedisana), work
parties (arnalima) and so on, complement each
other in mobilising labour resources.
The case study has also shown that understanding
social difference is key to exploring options for the
use of environmental resources. At a local level,
there are ongoing conflicts among actors delineated
according to different lines of social difference. For
example, it is able-bodied, poor women who collect
thatch grass in the nature reserve, while it is able-
bodied poor men or wealthier men (poachers) who
do the hunting (indicating differences along lines of
health, gender and wealth). It is useful to have a
clear understanding of these social differences and
any conflict that might exist between them in terms
of who uses what resource. This, in turn, can
inform participatory and co-management arrange-
ments between local communities and protected
areas authorities.
Clearly the prospects for co-management between
different rights holders requires an understanding
of how different social actors view the environment
and its use. This, in turn, requires identifying the
areas of conflict and complementarity The complex
task of unravelling the tangle of institutional rela-
tionships which mediate different people's access to
different resources is, however, an essential precur-
sor to any negotiation between competing groups.
The environmental entitlements approach provides
a framework for doing just that. With the issues
explicit and the overlaps, complementarities and
conflicts laid bare, the difficult task of seeking
acceptable outcomes through negotiation, debate,
and, ultimately, compromise can start.
Such processes are a central part of successful
development at the local level. In my view, a more
realistic approach to the many real and difficult
challenges of co-management may result in greater
chances of really sustainbie community-led devel-
opment initiatives on the ground. As with so many
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